The paper presents three pieces of evidence that the inventory risk faced by market-makers has a primary effect on option prices. First, I introduce a simple method for decomposing the price impact of trades into inventory-risk and asymmetricinformation components. The components are inferred from the difference between price responses of the market-maker who receives a trade and those who do not. Both price impact components are significant for option trades, but the inventory-risk component is larger. Second, using the full panel of option daily returns an instrumental variable estimation finds that option order imbalances attributable to inventory risk have five times larger impact on option prices than previously thought. Finally, past order imbalances have more predictive power than a set of fifty other plausible predictors of future option returns. 
Introduction
I study how the inventory risk faced by market makers affects prices in the equity options market. These variables have a well-established theoretical relation. Market makers are obliged to provide liquidity and accommodate customer order imbalances; thus, their position often deviates substantially from the desired level. A risk-averse investor requires higher expected return on his inventory as a compensation for holding a portfolio with suboptimal weights. Inventory risk is proportional to position's size and volatility, market-maker's risk aversion, and the expected holding period. Option marketmakers face inventory risk because in practice, options cannot be fully replicated by trading in the underlying.
The paper shows that option market-maker inventory risk has a primary effect on option prices. This conclusion is important for several reasons. First, the equity options market is economically large: options on about 1.5 billion shares are traded daily in the US. Second, option prices are extensively used to measure variables ranging from equity return volatility to the stochastic discount factor. These measures are potentially biased if the inventory risk component is not removed from option prices. Thus, a new generation of option pricing models that accounts for inventory risk is needed. Finally, the fact that inventory risk is central to the options market indicates that its role in other markets might be more important than previously thought. 1 The conclusion about the dominant role of inventory risk in options alters literature consensus.
2 Although the literature shows that buying pressure is associated with higher option prices, its economic magnitude is small compared to other factors making inventory risk a factor of secondary importance. The paper solves two methodological issues that explain the difference in results. First, order flow and prices are endogenous, so that the same factors, such as news, affect both. Thus, a popular approach of regressing option returns on same-day order imbalances can produce a biased coefficient. Second, besides having inventory-risk impact, order imbalance also contains informed trading (Shleifer, 1986) and correlates with changes in economic fundamentals.
This problem is commonly ignored by attributing the entire order imbalance to only one 1 Hendershott, Li, Menkvel and Seasholes (2013) find that inventory risk impacts stock prices up to one month horizon. Shachar (2012) shows that order flow affects CDS prices. 2 Bollen and Whaley (2004) and Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2009) of these three factors. 3 While addressing these problems, I find that the market-wide order imbalance has a particularly large effect on option prices as market-makers manage inventory risk on a portfolio basis.
The main conclusion is supported by two independent sets of results. First, I
establish the importance of inventory risk at the intraday level. Using a novel methodology, I find that the price impact of option trades has the inventory-risk component which is larger than the asymmetric-information component for every stock in my sample. The second part uses a full panel of daily option returns to establish that inventory risk is a dominant factor at the daily level. The instrumental variables approach identifies the inventory-risk component of price pressure by studying how past order option imbalances predict future imbalances. According to the IV approach, a typical inventory shock moves option prices by 3.7% on that day, which is five times larger than implied by conventional OLS estimates. Finally, I conduct a direct horse-race between more than fifty predictors of future option returns including the inventory-related order imbalance. The imbalance has the highest predictive power by a large margin. If it increases by one standard deviation, the next-day return is 1% higher.
Turning to the intraday part, the interaction between trades and quotes is a key to understanding how and why prices change. The literature has identified two reasons why quoted prices increase after a buyer-initiated trade. First, market makers adjust upward their beliefs about fair value as the trade may contain private information (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) . 4 Second, to manage inventory risk, market-makers require compensation for allowing their inventory position to deviate from the desired level.
Thus, a risk-averse market-maker can accommodate a subsequent buy order only at a higher price (Stoll, 1978) . 5 Both arguments imply that quotes change in the direction of trades but for different reasons.
Building on Huang and Stoll (1997) , I introduce a novel microstructure method for evaluating the size and relative importance of information asymmetry and dynamic 3 Pan and Poteshman (2006) and Ni, Pan, and Poteshman (2008) attribute all order imbalance to informed trading; Bollen and Whaley (2004) and Garleanu et al. (2009) to inventory risk; and Chen, Joslin, and Ni (2013) to fundamentals. 4 Other influential early papers include Bagehot (1971) ; Kyle (1985) ; Amihud and Mendelson (1986) ; Easley and O'Hara (1987) . 5 Other influential early papers include Amihud and Mendelson (1982) and Ho and Stoll (1981) .
inventory control for price dynamics. The method decomposes the price impact of trades into inventory-risk and asymmetric-information components. The main idea is that investors instantly receive identical information about a trade, while only the market maker at the trading exchange, the exchange where the trade is executed, experiences a change in inventory. Thus, the price response at the trading exchange includes both the asymmetric-information and inventory-risk components, while price impacts at the nontrading exchanges contain only the asymmetric-information component. Therefore, the difference between the price responses of the trading and non-trading exchanges identifies the inventory-risk component. Both price impact components can be easily estimated empirically from observed price responses. I formally implement this idea by extending the framework of Madhavan and Smidt (1991) to multiple competitive marketmakers.
A new method is needed because, as Huang and Stoll (1997) discuss, the existing methods struggle to separate the information and inventory components. 6 The methods commonly assume that the permanent price changes are attributed to asymmetric information while the impact of inventory risk is temporary and is reversed in a matter of minutes. However, empirical evidence suggests that although the effect of inventory risk on prices is by definition temporary, it sometimes takes weeks to unwind. 7 Thus, at the intraday level, the impact of both inventory risk and asymmetric information is largely permanent making it hard for conventional methods to separate them. The new method avoids this criticism as it makes no assumption about how long it takes for inventory impact to disappear. Overall, this method contributes to the literature on the role and measurement of market-maker inventory risk and on distinguishing inventory from asymmetric information components of bid-ask spreads.
6 Popular methods to measure asymmetric information include Glosten and Harris (1988) ; Hasbrouck (1988 Hasbrouck ( , 1991 ; George, Kaul, and Nimalendran (1991) ; Lin, Sanger, and Booth (1995) ; Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) ; Huang and Stoll (1997) . Lamoureux and Wang (2013) and Van Ness, Van Ness, and Warr (2001) compare these information measures. Madhavant and Smidt (1993) , Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) , Kavajecz and Odders-White (2001) , Naik and Yadav (2003) use actual inventory data to study market-maker behavior in the equity market. Ho and Macris (1984) as well as Manaster and Mann (1996) study the effect outside the equity market. 7 Hendershott and Seasholes (2007) , Hendershott, Li, Menkvel, and Seasholes (2013) , and Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007) Vijh (1990) , I find that option trades have significant price impact. Thus, trades bring a lot of new information and are a major reason why option prices change. Second, although both impacts are significant, inventory risk has larger price impact (0.4%) than asymmetric information (0.2%). Moreover, the inventory-risk component is larger for every stock in my sample.
Thus, at least within my sample, inventory risk plays a dominant role in the option price formation; although option market-makers are concerned about trading against informed investors, they are even more concerned with inventory control. Third, both price impacts are increasing and concave in trade size. Thus, large trades are more informed than medium and small trades suggesting that option investors do not engage in "stealth trading" anymore. Under the stealth trading strategy, informed investors split their option trades and medium size trades would be the most informed (Anand and Chakravarty, 2007) . Forth, the underlying stock price instantly responds to option trades; and the price impact of option trades on the underlying stock price is permanent and increasing in trade size. Option trades are informed about the underlying stock price level. This result complements a large literature on informed trading in the options market, which is based mostly on the daily returns evidence (e.g., Pan and Poteshman, 2006) . Finally, I study how the price impact components depend on option and trade parameters. Both price impacts are larger for out-of-the-money and short-term options, and buyer-initiated trades have larger impact particularly for inventory risk. 8 Most of these dependences are intuitive; for example, out-of-the-money options provide the highest leverage, which attracts informed investors. Overall, all these findings contribute to our understanding of the role of inventory risk and asymmetric information in option price formation.
The paper benefits from one of the largest datasets in the recent intraday options literature; however, several of sample's limitations must be acknowledged. Almost all the sample stocks have very actively traded options, and thus stocks with illiquid options are underrepresented. The sample period corresponds to mostly a bull market with relatively little market stress. These observations are important because several papers on the components of the bid-ask spread in equities find quite substantial variation in their magnitudes depending on method, sample, and period. Also, the method estimates the inventory-risk impact but is silent about the relevant time horizon at which it disappears.
However, my daily results partially address these concerns by showing that the inventory-risk effect on prices takes at least several days to unwind and is large for the entire universe of optionable stocks during a different sample period.
In the second part, I extend the analysis to the daily level and show that inventory risk is the main determinant of expected option returns. Using more than five years of daily market-makers' order imbalance data from the International Securities Exchange, I
study how inventory risk measured as market-maker order imbalance affects returns on delta-neutral option portfolios (whose value is neutral to small changes in the underlying price). Thus, the analysis is based on changes in inventory and prices rather than levels.
The instrumental variables approach shows that order imbalances are persistent in the option market, and the expected future imbalances are attributable to inventory risk rather than informed trading. It then quantifies the effect of inventory-related imbalances on option prices. In particular, in the first stage of the 2-SLS regression, order imbalance is separately instrumented by three nested sets of instruments based on option expiration dummy variables and past individual and market-wide order imbalances. All the coefficients in the first stage are highly significant implying that order imbalances are persistent; i.e., buying is followed by more buying on the next day. In the second stage, a regression of option returns on the predicted imbalances produces similar coefficient magnitudes across all instrument sets confirming their validity. The estimates suggest that the effect of inventory risk on prices is large. If the inventory-related order imbalance increases by one standard deviation, option returns will be 3.7% higher on the same day while the OLS estimates are five times smaller. The effect of inventory risk was previously underestimated because the role of market-wide order imbalance and the endogeneity problem were not considered.
Finally, I conduct a direct horse-race between the inventory-related order imbalance and more than fifty other predictors of future option returns. Option market-makers face substantial inventory risk because, although they hedge dynamically with the underlying stock, this hedging only partially reduces the volatility of an option portfolio. In practice, options cannot be perfectly replicated and the residual volatility is large because volatility is stochastic, prices and volatility often jump, the stochastic process for the underlying is unknown, and perhaps most importantly, hedging is not possible when markets are closed overnight. A combination of three factors makes inventory risk so significant in options. Market-maker combined capital is relatively small compared to the market size and the complexity of option risks.
Customer order flow is usually one-sided and forces them to hold inventory positions for long time, while institutional restrictions limit the entry of new liquidity providers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review of the related options literature. The third section introduces the market microstructure method, while sections four and five apply it to the equity options market.
Section six establishes the importance of inventory risk at the daily level. The internet appendix conducts a number of robustness tests and evaluates method's assumptions.
Related options microstructure literature
The literature on the interaction between option quoted prices and trades is scares.
My approach is closest in spirit and objective to Vijh (1990) and Berkman (1996) The paper is also related to the literature on the determinants of the bid-ask spread in the options market. I briefly review this literature here. Early papers document how the option bid-ask spread depends on option parameters. George and Longstaff (1993) show that the dollar bid-ask spread is increasing in option moneyness and time to expiration. In addition to this first-order effect, Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) find that the spread increases in measures of convexity such as option gamma and vega, 9 but the convexity explains a relatively small portion of the spread. These stylized facts are important but hard to interpret. The bid-ask spread consists of three components: fixed costs (also called "order processing costs"), inventory risk and asymmetric information. Do in-themoney options have larger spreads because informed investors prefer them or because of higher inventory risk? The literature does not offer a conclusive answer, but the variation in fixed costs across option classes is the most likely explanation. The fixed cost of establishing the initial delta-hedge (Cho and Engle, 1999; Kaul, Nimalendran and Zhang 2004) and maintaining it (rebalancing costs in Boyle and Vorst, 1992; Engle and Neri, 2010; Wu et al., 2013) can explain a significant portion of the spread for ITM and ATM options respectively. For example, Kaul et al. (2004) Overall, the paper complements the existing literature in several important ways.
Price impact decomposition method

Main idea
This section explains the intuition behind the proposed method, while the next section introduces it formally. Consider three competitive market makers A, B, and C, each at a separate exchange, who quote bid and ask prices for the same security in a modern electronic market environment. Imagine a buy order of size V* arrives to exchange A, the "trading exchange", and all three exchanges have been quoting exactly the same ask price right before the trade. Figure 1 ). The evaluation period Δ is set to 5 seconds in most empirical tests, which gives market makers more than enough time to respond; but is small enough to limit interference between multiple trades. In a general case, Eq.
(1) will also contain an error term as price responses are affected by other factors such as public non-trade information and microstructure noise.
Equations (1) can be easily solved for the two price impact components:
The asymmetric-information component is simply an average price response by non-trading market-makers, while the inventory-risk component is the difference between price responses of the trading and non-trading market-makers. This example considers a single trade, but because individual price responses are very noisy, taking an average over a large number of trades is required to estimate the components. Eq.
(1) will be generalized in the next section in Eq. (9-10) to account for trade direction, endogeneity between trades and quoted, and public news flow.
Overall, both price impact components are estimated by applying a modified version of Eq. (2) to the subsample of all trades for which multiple exchanges quote exactly the same price in the trade direction.
Dynamic conceptual framework
This section introduces a theoretical framework that extends the model of Madahavan and Smidt (1991) to multiple competitive market-makers. I then show how the two price impact components are estimated within this framework in a very similar way to the original idea in Eq. (1-2). The exposition follows closely Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) .
Consider a market for a risky security whose fundamental value evolves over time. A large number of fully competitive market-makers continuously quote bid and ask prices at which investors can buy or sell X shares. 10 My assumption of the fixed trade size is consistent with much of the previous literature including Madhavan, Richardson, and Roomans (1997) , Choi, Salandro, and Shastri (1988) , Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Huang and Stoll (1997), Roll (1984) among many others.
Finally, beliefs often respond slowly to public information. The expected change in beliefs Δ predicted by stale public information # is denoted ! Δ |# . Most models assume that all past public information is instantly reflected in prices and thus cannot predict future returns; yet empirically intraday returns are quite predictable, and this predictability cannot be ignored. Including this feature makes the framework more realistic but the main conclusions do not depend on it. Combining the three components together, market-maker's beliefs about fair value are changing according to: 
Eq. (5) is a classic decomposition of the bid-ask spread into asymmetric information θ, inventory risk 2 and fixed costs -components. Several methods are able to separate fixed costs from the rest of the bid-ask spread, but the existing methods have difficulty separating inventory and information components. Huang and Stoll (1997) summarize this by saying that "estimates of adverse information probably include inventory effects as well since existing procedures cannot distinguish the two."
12 Interestingly, Eq. (4) implies that if the difference between actual and desired inventory levels is large, inventory risk will cause prices to deviate substantially from fair value while having little effect on the bid-ask spread.
After following standard steps in Eq. (3-5), I explicitly account for the difference in market-maker responses to trades. If t is time of a trade and Δ is a small evaluation period that gives market-makers just enough time to respond to it, market-makers will set prices according to Eq. (4-5) at both times t and + Δ . However, how much the ask price increases after a buyer-initiated trade differs for the trading and non-trading market makers. To make it easier to follow, the analysis is first conducted only for a buy trade 
while non-trading market-makers get the same information but no change in inventory, thus they also increase ask price but by less than the trading market-maker:
13 12 Those models that address this criticism sometimes produce counter-intuitive empirical results. For example, the method of Huang and Stoll (1997) relies on the autocorrelation in order flow to be negative. However, the autocorrelation is positive empirically which leads to negative estimates for the asymmetricinformation component. Similarly, Hasbrouck (1988 Hasbrouck ( , 1991 suggests a vector-autoregressive framework that assumes that market-makers can relatively quickly restore their position to the desired level after an inventory shock. However, this assumption is often violated in practice as the lagged order flow in the autoregression usually covers only few minutes (about a hundred of one-second lags are common) while market-maker often spend many hours rebalancing inventory. 13 To better understand the multi-period price dynamics, consider an example of a sequence of buyerinitiated trades. Imagine, three market makers quote the same best ask price and three buy trades arrive one after another. After each trade, the trading market maker increases the ask price more than the non-trading peers. After the first trade, number of exchanges at the best asks decreases from three to two, and this number further shrinks to one after the second trade. But after the third trade, each market maker has received one trade and all three exchanges quote the best ask price again (the price will be higher of course because of inventory and information price impacts). This example illustrates how market makers maintain comparable inventory positions without direct interdealer trading. To simplify the notation, assume that buy and sell trades are conditionally equally likely, and thus ! |# = 0; and that the noise/error terms are combined into a single term ; '(,< = '( + . '( ,* + − . ,* + , which has zero mean by construction. The price responses of the trading (with index "i") and non-trading ("i-") market-makers in Eq. (6) and (6') can be then re-labeled with this simpler notation as:
And the difference between the price responses for trading and non-trading market-makers is:
Price responses (7') and (7) derived within this general framework match the intuitive results of Eq. (1) in the previous section. Indeed, the price response of the trading exchange (7') contains both the inventory-risk and asymmetric-information impacts, while the response of non-trading exchanges (7) contains only the information impact . However, both price responses also depend on the expected changes in price ! Δ |# and microstructure noise ; . Microstructure noise ; has zero mean and thus can be eliminated by taking an average over large number of trades. Note that the Law of Large Numbers (LLN) requires that average instead of median should be taken; Section A.3 explains that the distribution of ; is not symmetric due to price discreetness.
Unfortunately, the expected changes in price ! Δ |# cannot be averaged out in a similar way and should be estimated separately. Investors do not simply execute trades at random -they time their trades (Hasbrouck, 1991) . In particular, they buy when the price is expected to increase anyway, and thus ! Δ |# > 0 for buy trades and ! Δ |# < 0 for sell trades. Muravyev and Pearson (2014) further explain why accounting for expected price changes is crucial.
The inventory-risk and asymmetric-information components of price impact can be estimated from Eq. (7) and (8) in a sufficiently large sample so that the microstructure noise terms are averaged to zero. Finally, it is time to generalize the formulas to account for both buy and sell trades, which requires new notation. Trade direction indicator * ? is set to 1 for buy trades and -1 for sells. Price response Δ ,* ? is computed based on ask prices for buys (Δ ,* + ) and based on bid prices for sell trades (Δ ,* / ). After accounting for this notation, the main equations for the price impact decomposition become as follows: 
The inventory risk component of price impact is simply the difference between price responses of trading and non-trading market-makers adjusted for trade direction.
The asymmetric information component is an average of price responses for non-trading market-makers adjusted for the expected change in price due to slow diffusion of public information. Again, the intuition of Eq. (2) is preserved in this general framework.
Finally, I outline how the main equations (9) and (10) can be applied to the data. Second, market makers stand on the liquidity-providing side of most trades. 16 In the options, market makers not only transfer liquidity in time but also across different options. With more than a hundred option contracts available for each underlying, two investors rarely select the same option; thus, they are likely to trade with a market maker.
Also, exchange rules grant lead market-makers substantial competitive edge over other liquidity providers (e.g., the 60/40 NBBO order split rule 17 ). These rules further 15 The method can be potentially applied even in a market where market makers have private information about the trades they receive. Other market makers can learn the information by observing the price response of the trading market maker and inferring the asymmetric information component from it. The mechanism is similar to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who show how uninformed traders learn the informed trader's signal from the market equilibrium price in the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium. 16 The Options Clearing Corporation (OCC) website has data on market maker versus other investor volume which confirm this point (http://www.theocc.com/webapps/onn-volume-search).
17 "Exchange Rule 6.76A: … When an LMM or DOMM is quoting on the book at the NBBO, the LMM or DOMM receives a guaranteed allocation of 40% of the incoming order ahead of any other non-Customer interest ranked earlier in time. " SEC Release No. 34-62598 strengthen the lead market-makers' position as the main liquidity providers and make it hard for new players to enter.
Third, market makers do not share inventory in the options market. This practice was common in some OTC markets where dealers can trade directly with each other. For example, Lyons (1997) shows evidence of "hot potato" trading in the FX market. A large customer trade is followed by a sequence of smaller trades between dealers to share the inventory. In this case, all dealers will get some inventory, and their price responses to a trade will contain both information and inventory components. My method would underestimate the inventory-risk and overestimate the asymmetric-information component in this case. Section A.6 of the appendix shows that hot potato trading is not common in the options market. Also, although a market-making firm often makes markets in multiple stocks and at multiple exchanges, it makes market only at one exchange for options on any given stock.
Fourth, the method requires that many fully competitive market-makers operate in the market, otherwise the multi-period model becomes intractable. The strategic interaction is limited if market-makers are fully competitive, because in this case they post prices that make them indifferent between trading and not trading at any moment.
The prices are set conditional on getting a trade (Eq. 4) and thus do not depend on the probability of getting it. That is, the quoted prices are the same irrespective of how many exchanges are at the top of the book. 18 Also, if competition is imperfect, market makers will extract positive profits that are inversely proportional to the number of marketmakers at the top of the book in the oligopolistic-Cournot equilibrium (Kyle, 1989) . If three market-makers quote the same best ask price and a buy order arrives, two nontrading market-makers will increase the price not only because of asymmetric information but also because two market makers have more market power than three.
Thus, the method would underestimate the inventory-risk and overestimate the asymmetric-information price impact in the case of imperfect competition. Empirically, 18 However, if the number of market-makers is small, the interaction shows up through the second order effect on the expected order flow. The price response of the trading exchange changes the state of the limit order book. The non-trading market makers will respond to this change because conditional on them getting the next trade, the expected time it takes for them to trade out of the extra inventory depends on the state of the book. The direction of this effect is unclear though. However, if there are many market makers, the effect is small because actions of a single market maker change the limit order book very little.
the competition is high in the options market, for most trades at least four exchanges quote the best price. Also, instead of manually setting prices, market makers fully rely on computer programs, making it harder to implement strategic interactions.
Firth, options exchanges quote the same price most of the time because of the large tick size. For example, SEC report (2007, p. 8) shows that more than 75% of the time at least three exchanges quote the same NBBO price. This number is consistent with summary statistics for my sample in Table 1 .
Finally, Section A.5 discusses empirical and theoretical implications of inferring trade direction on my results. In short, because the method focuses on trades with multiple exchanges quoting the trade price, my test design insures that the number of misclassified trades is very small. Also, I show that trade misclassification does not affect the relative magnitude but will make both components smaller, and thus make it harder to find significant price impacts.
Data description and sample construction 4.1 Data description
The tick-level data were collected by Nanex, a firm specializing in selling real 
Data filters
The final sample, that satisfies the method requirements, is constructed in multiple steps. First, a standard prescreening eliminates illiquid and bizarre options.
Trade transactions should satisfy the following conditions:
(a) An option should have time to expiration between 10 and 400 calendar days.
19 Some stocks dropped before the end of the sample period because of mergers (America Online, Calpine, Nextel, SBC) or ticker changes (Morgan Stanley, Nasdaq 100 ETF QQQ). The sample size for these stocks is relatively small which may lead to non-representative results. Two ETFs were included in the sample after the beginning. Initially, the method cannot be applied to Dow Jones ETF (DIA) because it was traded only at a single exchange, but it was added to the sample after other exchanges start trading its options. Nasdaq 100 ETF (QQQQ) changed a ticker and exchange listing; I report its results separately before and after the ticker change. 20 The implied volatility of an option is defined as the value of the volatility for the underlying stock which, when input in the Black-Scholes model will return an option price equal to the market price of this option. Implied volatility is often used as a substitute for option prices. Option Greeks are sensitivities of option price to changes in the underlying price and volatility.
(b) Option moneyness measured by absolute option delta (i.e., the sensitivity of option price to changes in the underlying price) is between 0.2 and 0.8. That is, options with at least some "optionality" are selected. (10) is not well defined.
(e) Trade size is smaller than quoted size at the trading exchange. This condition is set to avoid mechanical price impact at the trading exchange.
(f) Option bid price is larger than ten cents to avoid outliers as price impact is normalized by option price. Table 1 reports sample size at each screening stage.
Computation of price impact components
The information-risk and asymmetric-inventory price impacts are estimated by applying Eq. (9) and (10) to the final sample of option trades that satisfy method's requirements from the previous section. I follow the general outline from the end of Section 3.2. Specifically, each trade in the final sample is first processed independently and then the average is taken for price responses over all trades. For each trade, I identify non-trading exchanges that together with the trading exchange quote NBBO price in the trade direction (price responses of the other exchanges are not used to avoid endogeneity). These price responses are used to compute the price impact components in four steps. First, following the method in Section A.2 of the internet appendix, I compute the expected price changes: i.e., by how much the relevant quoted price (bid for sell trades) were expected to change if no trade arrived. Second, following Eq. (9), the information price impact is computed by subtracting the expected quote changes from the actual quote changes for the non-trading exchanges over five-second evaluation period.
For example, if four exchanges (including the trading one) out of six quote NBBO price, then the average is taken over the unexpected price responses of the three non-trading exchanges. Third, following Eq. (10), the inventory price impact is computed as the difference between the price responses for the trading and non-trading exchanges. Eq. (9) and (10) also explicitly account for trade direction. The previous steps are computed in dollar terms, the price impacts are then normalize by the option quote midpoint of a given trade to make them comparable across options and stocks. Finally, as required by Eq. (9) and (10), I take an average over all trades for these individual price impacts to compute the final estimates of the asymmetric-information and inventory-risk components.
Summary statistics for the final sample are reported in Panel A of Table 1 . The asymmetric-information and inventory-risk impacts are 0.22% and 0.41% respectively.
Other sample statistics over the individual price impacts are also computed. The standard deviation is larger for the inventory impact (1.6% versus 2.6%) because the information impact averages price responses from multiple exchanges for each trade. The median information impact is negative because due to large tick size, quoted prices do not change after most trades while subtracted expected quote changes are mostly positive (quotes are expected to move in the trade direction). This difference between the mean and median caused by price discreetness is further explained in Section A.3 of the internet appendix.
On average, more than four exchanges out of six are quoting the best price at the time of a trade. The distribution for trade size is close to exponential with a mean of 29 contracts (or about 3,700 dollars) and a median of 8 contracts (800 dollars). Consistent with the literature on equity options, call trades outnumber put trades (66%); and there are more seller-initiated trades (58%) but mostly in call options. Option and stock prices vary substantially justifying why price impacts should be normalized.
Empirical results
The method produces five main empirical results. First, contrary to previous literature (Vijh, 1990) , I find that option trades have large price impact. The asymmetricinformation impact is 0.22% and the inventory risk impact is 0.41% for an average trade. 21 Thus, both asymmetric information and inventory risk are contributing substantially to price formation. Table 2 shows that the asymmetric information component is positive and significant for every stock in the sample. Except for two special cases, America Online (0.02% in a small sample) and QQQ Nasdaq ETF (0.04%),
the remaining values are large and lie between 0.13% (Nextel) and 0.5% (Ford). The price impacts remain positive for most subsamples of trades based on option and trade characteristics. Fourth, stock price instantly responds to option trades. This result confirms that option trades indeed contain private information about the underlying price and complements the existent literature, which is based mostly on daily return data. The underlying price moves by 0.02 basis points (or 0.03 cents in dollar terms) in the direction of option trade (after adjusting for option type; e.g., stock price decreases after one buys a put). Although the effect is not large economically, it is highly statistically significant and is positive for all but one stock (Nasdaq ETF QQQ). Last column in Table   3 reports how the stock price impact of option trades depends on option characteristics.
The single most significant variable is trade size. Large trades have three times more impact than small trades. Surprisingly, trades of different moneyness have similar price impact, while short-term options have slightly higher price impact. Overall, although option trades contain significant information about the underlying price, most of their information however is option-specific.
Tables 3 reports how the price impact components depend on option and trade characteristics. 23 Out-of-the-money options offer the highest leverage (exposure for a dollar invested), and thus are particularly attractive for informed investors. Consistent with this argument, the information price impact is decreasing and convex in absolute 23 Large sample size is necessary to estimate the price impacts because the distribution for quote changes is discrete and highly skewed with the majority of trades having zero impact. This discreetness is caused by a large tick size in the options market. R-square is low for the same reason. All regressions are estimated with stock-day (or stock) fixed effects, while kernel regression used for the figures are based on the pooled sample.
delta. Figure 3 .D shows that the impact decreases from 0.4% for OTM options to 0.15% for ITM options. Next, private information is often short-lived and is related to near-term events, thus short-term options are better suited for informed investors in addition to providing higher leverage. Indeed, the price impact decreases by 0.12% if time-toexpiration decreases from 80 days to 20 days. Buyer-initiated trades have higher price impact than sell trades because they give an opportunity to bet not only on future volatility but also on the underlying direction. These results are broadly consistent with Pan and Poteshman (2006) , except that I do not find significant difference between call and put options, perhaps because my sample consists of large stocks that are easy to sell short. As for inventory risk, its price impact also decreases with moneyness from 0.8%
for OTM to 0.2% for ITM options. The put-call parity implies that the paired ITM and OTM options should have similar risk profile, but because the price impact for OTM options is normalized by smaller option price this mechanically leads to larger price impact for them. Buy trades have much larger inventory impact (by 0.15%) because a market-maker selling an option faces large downside risk. The inventory risk impact is higher for calls than for puts because a seller of a call faces a risk of unlimited loses.
Overall, inventory and information impacts have similar conditional properties because options with highest leverage also have highest inventory risk per dollar invested.
Several additional tests are reported in Table A9 and Figure 3 . Earnings announcement days are characterized by high intraday volatility and information asymmetry. Indeed, both price impacts are higher on the announcement days. Time of day has similar implications as volatility is high at the beginning and the end of trading.
Consistent with this hypothesis, both price impacts are higher during the first and last hours of trading. Also, I find that the information impact increased significantly during the sample period, while the inventory impact remained largely unchanged. To check the robustness of nonparametric estimates of price impacts in Figure 2 , I examine several subsamples in Figure 3 and confirm that inventory risk continues to have bigger price impact than asymmetric information for all of them. The first panel shows the price impacts for the narrow range in absolute delta being between 0.4 and 0.6 and less than 50 days to expiration with the idea of checking the results within a homogenous set of options. Next, I consider the sample with the number of quoting exchanges equal to three instead of being at least two to check that the results are consistent if the number of exchanges is fixed. Finally, the evaluation period is increased from 5 to 10 seconds in the last subsample.
It should be repeated that because my sample consists mostly of stocks with liquid options, the results are hard to extrapolate to stocks with illiquid options. To somewhat address this concern, both information and inventory price impacts are larger for stocks that had the lowest average option trading volume during the periods when they were in the sample. 24 Finally, my results offer little help in answering the puzzle of why option bid-ask spreads are so huge. This is one of the biggest puzzles in the options literature; the existing theories of option spread fail to explain its magnitude and shape (Muravyev and Pearson, 2014) . For example, the effective bid-ask spread is almost 7% of option price in my sample of trades. I find that although inventory risk and asymmetric information components are large, they explain only 18% of the spread size (and thus the remaining 82% are attributed to fixed costs). 25 These estimates are consistent with the decompositions for the stock spread. For example, Huang and Stoll (1997) attribute 88.6% of the stock spread to the fixed costs component.
Inventory risk and daily option returns
The microstructure approach provides extensive evidence on the role of inventory risk in option price formation. However, this approach is not suitable for answering some of the questions. How large is the effect of inventory risk at the daily and longer horizons? Inventory-risk effect is by definition temporarily; how long does it last? Also, the tick-level options data are hard to process because of its large size, which constraints the microstructure approaches to a small number of stocks (39 in my case). This section introduces an independent approach to measuring inventory risk at the daily level, which answers these questions and thus complements my intraday results.
After establishing the importance of inventory risk at the intraday level, this section confirms this conclusion at the daily level with two pieces of evidence. First, 24 The five stocks with the lowest average daily option trading volume when they were in the sample were Capital One Financial, Calpine, Ford, SBC Communications, and Xilinx, with ticker symbols COF, CPN, F, SBC, and XLNX, respectively. 25 The share of the spread explained by the components can be computed as the sum of their magnitudes divided by bid-ask half spread, which is implied by Eq. (5). Specifically, 18% = (0.22%+0.4%)/3.46%.
using the full panel of option daily returns an instrumental variable estimation finds that inventory-related part of option order imbalances has five times larger impact on option prices than previously thought. Second, the order imbalances have more predictive power than a set of fifty other plausible predictors of future option returns.
The literature shows the correlation between order imbalances and implied volatility, while this paper complements it by identifying the inventory-related part of order imbalance and quantifying its causal effect on option returns. More importantly, the paper shows that inventory risk is not a secondary factor as previously thought but is a primarily determinant of expected option returns. Bollen and Whaley (2004) inventory-related component of order flow and using instrumental variable estimation to account for endogeneity. After addressing these endogeneity concerns, the effect of inventory risk on option prices is five times larger than previously thought.
Computation of option returns and order imbalances
The two key variables for the daily analysis are option returns and order imbalances. Returns of delta-neutral option portfolios assess a cumulative risk premium embedded in option prices without relying on a specific option pricing model. Deltaneutral portfolios are immune to small changes in the underlying and thus to stock risk premiums. Order imbalance is a direct measure of changes in option market-maker positions and thus their inventory risk. I divide options into four time-to-expiration groups: expiring options (with less than 13 calendar days to expiration), short-term options (with 30 days to expiration on average), mid-term options (with no more than 150 days left), and finally long-term options. For each day, stock and expiration group, I pick the call-put pair closest to the at-the-money (ATM) point for the shortest expiration. For the selected call-put pair, I compute option returns from the end of day t-1 until the end of the next trading day t. Specifically, a straddle portfolio is created by buying one call option and as many puts (Δ F /|Δ | puts) as required to make it delta-neutral and then this portfolio is hold for one day. Following the literature, I compute returns using option quote midpoints. Eq. (11) summarizes the return definitions. For robustness, I also use delta-neutral returns on individual calls. Unless otherwise stated, I refer to the deltaneutral straddle returns for short-term options simply as "option returns". Table 4 shows that average option returns are close to zero in my sample;
however, as expected, the return distribution is skewed and the median for daily returns is -1.3%. If the underlying price does not change, straddle's value decreases.
I compute option order imbalances accommodated by market-makers at the stock level and then also aggregate them into the market-wide imbalance. Following Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004), order imbalance is defined as the difference between the number of option buy and sell transactions by non-market-makers divided by the total number of option trades on a given day. E.g., market-makers are net sellers of options if the order imbalance is positive. Importantly, the data identifies which trade side is taken by option market makers.
( )
The simple order imbalance can be adjusted to distinguish between low and high volume days by normalizing it by the average number of trades in the previous 30 days instead of the number of trades on day t. A measure of market-wide order imbalance shows whether option investors are buying or selling at the aggregate level. It is defined as an average of individual order imbalances weighted by the average option volume during the previous 250 trading days. Table 4 shows that option order imbalance is -5% on average; option investors are net sellers of options (especially call options).
After standard filters are applied, 28 the final sample in most regressions exceeds one million stock-day observations; with more than a thousand eligible stocks on a typical day. The paper controls for most of the variables that are known to predict option returns. The internet appendix describes more than 50 control variables. Tables 5 and A3 report summary statistics and correlations for selected variables. Interestingly, the correlation table shows that despite option volume, skew and the bid-ask spread are often used as proxies for demand pressure, they have a negligible correlation with the direct measure of order imbalance.
Instrumental variables approach
An instrumental variables approach resolves the endogeneity between concurrent option returns and order flow by establishing that past order imbalances are good instruments of future imbalances. Past order imbalances predict future changes in marketmaker inventory, which in turn cause changes in option prices. This idea is implied by Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004) in their model.
The first stage of the 2-SLS regression establishes that option order imbalances are highly persistent. In particular, future order imbalance is predicted separately by three nested sets of instruments (Eq. 14). The first set contains only expiration day dummies, with a separate dummy variable for each of five days centered on the post-expiration
Monday. The second instrument set expends the first set by adding two lags of marketwide order imbalance to the expiration dummies. Market-wide imbalances are not affected by informed trading as private information about the entire market is hard to 28 Stocks-days with stock prices below five dollars or with positive option volume on less than 80 days per year are excluded. Returns are computed only for options that satisfy three criteria: (1) both option bid prices should be larger than ten cents; (2) OptionMetrics deltas should be well defined; and (3) the option bid-ask spread should be less than 50% of the price and the quote midpoint should be larger than 40 cents.
obtain. Finally, the third set of instruments adds two lags of individual order imbalance to the second set. With this instrument set, both time-series and cross-section dimensions can be explored.
Expiration dummies are particularly good instruments. Investors substitute expiring option positions with similar non-expiring ones in the three-day window around the expiration day (every third Friday of a month). Because investors are short call and put equity options on average, the rollover creates unprecedentedly large selling pressure in the non-expiring options. Lagged variables are a popular instrument choice in economics, and they indeed solve the econometric problem here. However, it is not a priori clear whether all predicted order imbalances should be attributed to the inventory-risk channel. For example, individual order imbalances may be informed about future volatility and through it, about future option returns. The private information contained in order imbalances may take time to be reflected in the prices. Section A.9 in the internet appendix addresses this concern by showing that the predicted order imbalances are driven primarily by inventory risk rather than informed trading.
After settling on the instruments, I apply a standard 2-SLS approach to study the effect of order imbalance on option returns, which is G 6 in Eq. (14) and (15 
Second stage:
All the coefficients in the first stage are highly significant as reported in Panel A of Table 5 , the instruments are strong. Order imbalance is extremely negative around option expiration because investors are rolling over their positions to non-expiring options. The selling pressure is particularly large on the post-expiration Monday when the abnormal order imbalance riches -24%. Large negative order imbalances are also observed on the day before and after (-8.7% and -11.7% respectively) . The expiration rollover is perhaps the strongest calendar seasonality in the options market. Next, order imbalances are very persistent in the options market as both past market-wide and individual imbalances have large positive coefficients. For example, a market-wide imbalance of -10% today predicts a -6.5% imbalance tomorrow. Thus, if an option market-maker observes an increase in his inventory on one day, then his net position is likely continue to increase on the next day.
The second stage results are reported in Panel B of Table 5 . First, the average return sensitivity to order flow across the instrument sets is 0.15, which means that inventory risk has a very large impact on option prices. For example, one standard deviation increase in expected order imbalance (which is 25% for the last instrument set) corresponds to 3.7% option return. Second, the OLS coefficient of 0.025 is consistent with estimates by Bollen and Whaley (2004) after adjusting the units. However, this coefficient is six times smaller than 0.15 produced by the instrumental variables approach. Thus, accounting for endogeneity makes a big difference. The measurement error bias can partially explain the difference in estimates.
30 Third, the coefficient estimates for all the instrument sets have similar magnitudes (15.4%, 17.8%, and 11.5% respectively), which validates the instruments. Finally, the fact that market-wide order imbalance has a significant effect on returns distinguishes the inventory channel from the "mechanical price pressure" hypothesis. The price pressure hypothesis does not expect option prices to be moved by order imbalance in other securities.
Overall, the instrumental variables approach shows that inventory risk is a major factor for the entire panel of option daily returns.
Return predictability: inventory risk versus other factors
The instrumental variables approach assesses the absolute magnitude of the inventory risk effect on option prices while this section evaluates its relative importance for predicting future option returns. The instrumental variables approach shows that past order imbalances are an excellent measure of future inventory shocks. Building on this result, I conduct a first direct horse-race between the past order imbalance and more than fifty of option returns predictors. The order imbalance wins the contest by a large margin.
Also, the horse-race ranks the relative importance of option "anomalies," so that the literature can focus on explaining the largest of them.
I estimate a panel regression in Eq. (16) 
Based on the results in Table 6 , if the combined order imbalance increases by one standard deviation, option returns are expected to be 1% higher on the next day, while other predictors have a magnitude of at most 0.4% (per standard deviation). First, I
include the individual order imbalance on day t-1 which is highly significant with tstatistics of 18 even in the presence of all the control variables. Next, I add the marketwide order imbalance which has a t-statistic of "only" nine because its value is the same for all stocks on a given day reducing its statistical power. To assess the combined economic magnitude of order imbalance measures, I aggregate them into a single factor using coefficient estimates from the regression. Changes and levels of implied volatility can predict next-day return (0.39%) but fail to predict returns on subsequent days, and thus, are likely to be driven by microstruture effects. Section A.10 of the internet appendix discusses these and other predictors and their interpretation.
Overall, option order flow, a proxy for future inventory shocks, is by far the strongest predictor of future option returns.
Conclusion
The paper presents three pieces of evidence that inventory risk has a primary effect on option prices. First, I find that option trades have substantial price impact, and the inventory-risk component of price impact is larger than the asymmetric-information component for every stock in my sample. This intraday result is supplemented by two results that use daily order imbalances accumulated by option market-makers. An instrumental variable estimation finds that inventory-related part of option order imbalances has five times larger impact on option prices than previously thought. Finally, past order imbalances have more predictive power than a set of fifty other plausible predictors of future option returns.
The daily results complement the intraday evidence in several ways. They show that inventory risk has a long-term effect on option prices and provide alternative ways of assessing its economic significance. For example, the inventory risk premium is larger than most known option return "anomalies." Also, these results show that inventory risk matters for the full panel of optionable stocks and a longer sample period than is available for the intraday analysis.
The paper introduces a novel method for decomposing the price impact of trades into inventory-risk and asymmetric-information components and then applies it to the equity options market. The inventory-risk component is inferred from the difference between price responses of market-maker who receives a trade and those who do not. The asymmetric-information component is estimated as an average price response by marketmakers who do not participate in a given trade adjusted for expected changes in price.
The method is particularly well suited for the options market; however, it can be also applied to many other markets including the bond and equity markets. Overall, this method contributes to the literature on the role and measurement of market maker inventory risk and on distinguishing inventory from asymmetric information components of bid-ask spreads.
I apply the method to equity options and find that inventory risk plays a primary role in the option price formation. Both information and inventory price impacts are large for option trades, but the inventory-risk component is almost always larger at least in my sample. That is, option trades have high information content; however, although option market-makers are concerned about trading against informed investors, they are even more concerned with controlling inventory risk.
Overall, my results suggest that inventory risk in the options market, and compensation for bearing it, are important components of option price dynamics. (9) and (10) and are measured over five-second evaluation period and are normalized by option quote midpoint. All price impacts and expected quote changes are adjusted to make the sign comparable across buys and sells. A kernel regression uses the Gaussian kernel with an adaptive width which is larger in the low-populated regions (big trade size). Each option contract is written on hundred underlying shares. Confidence intervals are not reported because they are trivial with large sample size. Trade price = NBBO price, with at least 2 exchanges quoting it, Trade size < quoted size, Option price > 10 cents Table 2 The components of price impact for the 36 stocks and 4 ETFs. Asymmetric information and inventory risk price impacts as well as expected changes in option price and the price impact of option trades on the underlying stock are reported for each stock in the sample. The components of price impact are estimated by Eq. (9) and (10). All price impacts and expected quote changes are adjusted to make the sign comparable across buys and sells. The averages in the last row are trade-weighted averages of the stock/ETF values. Ticker symbols indicated with * dropped before the end of the sample period (while ** were added after the start). ETFs are marked with " E ". All price impacts are reported in percent except for the stock price impact which is in basis points. Stock price impact is adjusted for trade direction (call/put, buy/sell) and is normalized by stock quote midpoint. Options are divided into four days-toexpiration groups. Ultra short-term ("p=0") with less than 13 calendar days to expiration; shortterm ("p=1") with on average 30-days; mid-term ("p=2") with no more than 150 days; and longterm ("p=3") with more than 150 days. Option returns ("OptRet") are computed for a deltaneutral straddle portfolio (long) based on the call-put pair which is closest to at-the-money. The order imbalance is based on the difference between the number of buy and sell trades normalized by the total number of trades on a given day ("OrdImb") or by the average number of trades in the previous 30 days ("AdjOrdImb"). "MWOrdImb" is market-wide order imbalance. "OptBidAsk" is the dollar option bid-ask spread for short-term options. "OptVolume" is option volume measured in contracts. "IV30" is 30-days-to-expiration implied volatility. "Skew60" is a logarithm ratio of OTM to ATM implied volatilities for 60-days-to-expiration options. "RNSkewness" is risk-neutral skewness. "diff(IV)" is a one-day change in short-term implied volatility. "IV60 -StdRet" is the difference between implied and historical volatilities. Table 5 The instrumental variables approach. Both stages of two-stage least squares from Eq. (14) and (15) are reported. I use three nested sets of instruments. The first contains only expiration dummies. The second adds two lags of the market-wide order imbalance by nonmarket-makers to the first set. The third adds two lags of the individual order imbalance. "n0" is a dummy which corresponds to the first day after expiration, usually fourth Monday of a month ("n_1 precedes n0"). The order imbalance is based on the difference between the number of buy and sell trades normalized by the total number of trades on a given day ("OrdImb") or by the average number of trades in the previous 30 days ("AdjOrdImb"). MWOrdImb measures a market-wide order imbalance. All regressions include a battery of control variables. The absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by date. Table 6 Horse-race between option return predictors. Option returns on day t are predicted by order imbalances and other variables from day t-1. Column 2 reports standard deviations to facilitate computing economic magnitudes. Columns 3 and 4 gradually add order imbalances from day t-1. If two measures of order imbalance are combined into one factor weighted with estimated coefficients (0.008*OrdImb t-1 +0.198* MWOrdImb t-1 ), this factor has standard deviation of 1%. Thus, one standard deviation change in the combined order imbalance changes expected returns on the next day by 1%. Short-term option returns are computed for a deltaneutral straddle portfolio (long) based on the call-put pair which is closest to at-the-money. The order imbalance is based on the difference between the number of buy and sell trades normalized by the total number of trades on a given day ("OrdImb"). MWOrdImb is a market-wide order imbalance. I also report the most significant control variables. "Weekend" dummy is one if t is Monday. "IV(p=1)" is implied volatility for short-term options. "diff(IV) t-1 " is one-day change in short-term implied volatility. "AbsStkRet t-1 " is absolute stock returns. "COStdRet -StdRet" is open-close volatility relative to close-to-close volatility. The absolute t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by date. 
